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A PATENT POOL'S WHITE KNIGHT:
INDIVIDUAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND

THE PROCOMPETITIVE PRESUMPTION
ABSTRACT

After decades of volatile treatment, patent pools have gained
traction with U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies. In 1995, the
Department of Justice (DOJ)and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) published guidelines that identified numerous
procompetitive benefits of intellectual property licensing
arrangements. As the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office continues
to grant patents at a swift rate, patent pooling arrangements
increasingly provide for an effective means of "navigating the
patent thicket. "' However, parcel to the agencies' reluctance to
move past their foundational statements, today's crowded
intellectual property markets have been plagued by a lack of
patent pool formation. Consequently, the enforcement agencies'
static policy with respect to intellectual property licensing may
ultimatelyfrustrate efficient means of innovation.
In response to what the author views as a growing problem, this
note arguesfor a legal presumptionfavorable to patent pools that
adopt individual patent licensing schemes. Individual licensing
internalizes a market-based form of analysis concerning the
competitive characteristicsof patents included within a pool as an
alternative to the manually applied essentiality standard-a
linchpin of today's rule of reason analysis. Through the
internalization of regulation, the proposed presumption stands to
provide a more efficient means of organizing and regulatingpatent
pools.

1. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, 119,
119 (Adam B. Jaffe, et al., eds., 2001).
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I. INTRODUCTION

With the issuance of the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property 2 (1995 Guidelines), the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) set out on a dizzying expedition to balance the principles of
the antitrust and intellectual property laws. Competing theories
concerning the competitive benefits of patent pools have placed
such licensing arrangements squarely in the expedition's
crosshairs.3 Designed to reduce the transaction and search costs
associated with intellectual property licensing agreements, patent
pools consolidate costs into a one-stop-shopping experience.'
Furthermore, patent pools act to offer firms a solution to the threat
of hold-up-a common fear in today's crowded intellectual
property markets.5
The hold-up problem refers to a situation in which two or more
firms hold patents essential to a given process. 6 A licensee
wishing to implement the process must negotiate individual
licenses with each firm.7 As the licensee acquires individual
licenses, subsequent licensors may extract increasingly more in
terms of fees.8 When the licensee attempts to negotiate a license
for the last remaining essential patent, the licensor has an incentive
to demand a fee up to the monopoly profit for the given
technology. 9
2. U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES

(1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm (hereinafter 1995
Guidelines).
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

3. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 127 ("Under a patent pool, an entire group of
patents is licensed in a package, either by one of the patent holders or by a new
entity established for this purpose, usually to anyone willing to pay the

associated royalties.").
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 134.
See id. at 124-26.
See id. at 124-25.
See id.

8. See id. In such a case, "[t]he patentee can credibly seek far greater
royalties, very likely backed up with the threat of shitting down the [licensee] if
the Court indeed finds the patent valid and infringed and grants injunctive
relief." Id. at 125.
9. See id.
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The social costs associated with the hold-up problem are
enormous-licensing fees are determined by a licensor's position
in the negotiation process rather than on the underlying value of
the patent.'° A patent pool alleviates the hold-up problem to the
degree that the pool contains a complete set of patents essential to
a particular technology." Moreover, licensors of essential patents
welcome the formation of a patent pool as a way to avoid the
complements problem, which occurs when two firms holding
essential inputs fail to internalize complementary effects. 2 The
problem refers to the inefficiencies that result from the build up of
patent royalty fees.13 In sum, a patent pool arrangement achieves
greater profits for licensors while reducing the overall licensing
cost to the licensee.
The benefits announced above are, however, countered by
several antitrust concerns.
Such concerns focus on pooling
arrangements that, through market division or price-fixing, may
harm competition between potential competitors in a relevant
market, resulting in higher prices, lower output, or a reduced
incentive to innovate. 14 In an attempt to sift through the pros and
cons of pooling arrangements, the 1995 Guidelines promulgated a
"rule of reason" approach designed to assess whether the pool
improves the competitive conditions of a market. 5 Under the rule
of reason approach, the Agency inquires whether a particular
restraint on trade "is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if
so, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve
precompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive
effects."' 6 Floundering in its application of the rule of reason, the
Justice Department has in practice committed to a stricter
standard-a standard that frustrates efficient means of innovation
through patent pool formation. The inefficiency results from an
imperfect classification system that operates to assign character to

10. See ABA

SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND

ANTITRUST HANDBOOK

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

135 (2007).

See id.
See id.
See id. at 133.
See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.1.
Seeid. § 3.4.
Id.
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the competitive relationship among patents included within a
pooling arrangement. 7 This note argues that a procompetitive
presumption, granted to patent pools that offer individual patent
licensing agreements, presents a more efficient means of
organization and regulation than does the current rule of reason
The term procompetitive presumption, as used
approach.
throughout this note, means a legal inference that the patent pool
does not present a realistic threat to competition. In a more
accurate reflection of a dynamic market, the presumption
internalizes regulation relying on the market-like function of
individual licensing in order to identify the competitive
relationship between patents.
This note proceeds in six parts: Part II discusses patent character
designations and the associated classification problem. Part III
provides a brief overview of the common law history behind
patent pools and today's antitrust policies. Part IV introduces the
tension created in applying traditional antitrust principles to
contemporary intellectual property markets. Part V outlines a
Justice Department business review letter issued in conjunction
with the DVD-6 patent pool. Part VI explains the structure and
function of the procompetitive presumption advanced by this note.
Lastly, part VII examines possible ancillary effects spawned by the
presumption.
II. PATENT PEDIGREE

Whether a patent pool improves a market's transactional
efficiency depends on the competitive characteristics of the patents
included within the pool's offering." Consequently, a complete
understanding of the competitive relationship between patents is
crucial to any analysis of pooling arrangements.
A. Substitute Patents
Substitute patents are two or more patents that may be used

17. See id. ("Application of the rule of reason generally requires a
comprehensive inquiry into market conditions.").
18. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 4.1.
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interchangeably by a prospective licensee. 9 Similar to horizontal
competitors in traditional markets, the owners of substitute patents
compete on terms of price and quality, which presents the
opportunity for firms to price above competitive levels by entering
into anticompetitive agreements.2°
B. Blocking Patents
Blocking patents represent the nature of innovation in today's
intellectual
property
markets-"cumulative
investigation
combined with hypothesis testing."'" A patent is said to be
blocking when a subsequent technology unavoidably infringes
upon the prior patent.22 The result is illustrated by analogizing the
process of cumulative innovation to the construction of a
pyramid. 23 As the pyramid rises, each block rests on the support of
the many beneath it.24 Similarly, a firm, in designing what it hopes
to be a more desirable technology, "must gain the permission of
each person who previously placed a block in the pyramid, perhaps
paying a royalty . . . to gain such permission. '"25 As a result, a
firm's transaction costs associated with obtaining "permission"
from prior inventors increases as the technology's foundation
broadens. 26 The rise in transaction costs is paralleled by a growing
risk of unintentional infringement.27 The cost of unintentional
infringement lies with the remedy that protects patent rights19. See Steven C. Carlson, PatentPools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16

YALE

J. ON REG. 359, 365 (1999). Substitute patents may also be referred to as rival
or competitive patents: "[c]ompeting patents result when inventors devise totally
novel products or processes that provide market substitutes for patented goods,
or when inventors sufficiently modify existing patented goods so that the
original patent is deemed 'invented around' and not infringed." Id.
20. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.2. "However, antitrust concerns

may arise when a licensing arrangement harms competition among entities that
would have been actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in
the absence of the license (entities in a "horizontal relationship")." Id. § 3.1.
21. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 119.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 120
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 124-26.

27. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 125.
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injunctive relief and the patent holder's ability to halt the business
operations of the infringing company. 8
The Patent and Trademark Office's grant of improvement
patents, issued to provide further incentives to innovate, adds even
more blocks to the pyramid. 9 The result is an improvement patent
that is "subservient" to the underlying "dominant" patent-both
patent holders are restricted from exploiting the other's
technology.3" A classic example involves the pioneers of flight,
the Wright Brothers, and the invention of Glenn Curtiss and
Alexander Graham Bell.3 The Wright Brothers owned a patent
covering the wing-warping design of an aircraft's wings-a
method for stabilizing flight.32 Subsequently, Curtiss and Bell
obtained a patent on the use of wing flaps, an improvement on the
Wright Brothers' wing-warping design.33 In 1916, at a time when
all airplanes featured wing flaps, the Curtiss patent was found to
infringe on the Wright patent." Therefore, both the Curtiss and
Wright patents were reciprocally blocking and consumers were
denied access to the commercially successfully stabilizing
device.35
C. Complementary Patents
Complementary patents are similar to blocking patents in that
the functionality of a patented technology requires the cooperation
of one or more additional patent holders.36 The complementary
relationship arises when two firms independently develop and
patent technology processes that are later incorporated into a larger
product."7
Development of the larger product necessitates

28. Id.
29. See Carlson, supra note 19, at 363.
30. See id.
31. See George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft
PatentAgreement, 31 J.L. & ECON. 227, 230-32 (1988).
32. See id. at 231.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.

36. See Carlson, supra note 19, at 364.
37. Id. at 364-65.
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permission from both of the patent holders." A common example
is the manufacture of a light bulb, which requires the manufacturer
to utilize elements from patents covering both vacuum bulbs and
tungsten filaments.39 Without a license from both patent holders,
production will not occur.4"
D. The ClassificationProblem
Although the definitions of the competitive relationships shared
between patents may be neatly titled, defining a particular
relationship is difficult.41 Initially, the competitive quality of
patents will depend on how broadly the scope of the pool's
purpose is drawn.42 If a pool purports to collectively license
patents related to the manufacturer of jet airplanes, one can hardly
43
imagine labeling a particular patented technology as blocking.
Additionally, the rate at which firms invest in research and
development often renders patented technologies obsolete within a
relatively short time period."
A patented technology that is
essential to manufacturing a product today may be replaced within
six months by a cheaper and more efficient alternative.45
Legal factors associated with the U.S. patent laws also serve to
complicate the classification process. First, a patent that contains
multiple or broad claims may initially appear to block newly
developed technology. 46 However, if, through litigation, certain
claims are invalidated, the patent may subsequently be deemed
38. Id. at 365.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 365. "One scholar noted that the lines of demarcation among
the three kinds of patents 'are very narrow' and that 'in many instances, a mere
shift of focus or frame of reference will result in a different categorization for
the same patents' Id.
42. See James J. Kulbaski, Comments on Patent Pools and Standardsfor
Federal Trade Commission Hearings Regarding Competition & Intellectual
Property, *5 (2002), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020417james
jkulbaski.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
925, 939 (2001).
45. See id.
46. See Carlson, supra note 19, at 366.
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competitive.47 Second, under the doctrine of equivalents, a patent
is read more broadly than the plain meaning of its claim(s).48
Intended to deter a would-be infringer, the doctrine creates further
uncertainty regarding the competitive relationship between
patents.49 Third, despite the efforts of the Federal Circuit, patent
law remains a collage of doctrinal interpretations leaving courts
without a unified standard to measure the scope and enforceability
of patents."
The preceding discussion highlights the complexity of the patent
character classification process facing firms, experts, enforcement
agencies, And courts. The relevant factors require a speculative
analysis of future market conditions and the success of patent
litigation. As a result of its undue reliance on a manual analysis of
the foregoing factors, the current rule of reason approach lacks
predictability and, consequently, fails to provide adequate
guidance for the formation of pooling arrangements.
Alternatively, the procompetitive presumption supplies an
objective means of organization and regulation through a pool's
elective adoption of individual licensing. 1 Subsequently, the
complex factors relevant to defining the competitive quality of a
pool's offering are filtered through market-based principles. 2

III. FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO TODAY'S FEDERAL
CIRCUIT

Since the turn of the 2 0 th Century, a fierce debate has raged over
the development of a cohesive doctrine that embodies the
underlying principles of the intellectual property and antitrust
laws. For over 100 years, patent licensing schemes have ridden

47. See id.
48. See id. (describing the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents as being "to
prevent would be infringers from circumventing a patent by trivially modifying
the patented good.").

49.
50.
51.
52.

See id.
See id.
See Part V(B), infra.
See Part V(D), infra.
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the tide of this debate. 3 The following discussion attempts to
summarize the unstable history of patent licensing as a backdrop to
the contemporary phenomenon of patent pools. 4
A. Freedom of Contract
Initially, patent licensing enjoyed sweeping protection under the
theory of freedom of contract as illustrated by the Supreme Court's
decision in E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow, Co.55
Organized as a holding company, National Harrow owned and
licensed eighty-five patents relating to the manufacture of float
spring tooth harrows. 6 The licensing agreements were challenged
under the Sherman Act as unlawful restraints on competition. 7
Although the licensing agreements had the effect of fixing the
price of harrows sold throughout the United States, the Court gave
complete deference to a patent holder's "absolute freedom in the
use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States. 58
After National Harrow, enforcement of the antitrust laws was
limited so as not to impede a patent holder's ability to
contractually maintain his monopoly or fix prices. 9
B. Anticompetitive Until Proven Competitive?
The laissez-faire treatment of patent licensing was substantially
curtailed by the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Sanitary
Manufacturing, Co. v. United States.6" In ordering the dissolution
of a patent pool that covered eighty-five percent of the enameled
ironware manufacturing market, the Court placed limits on a
patent holder's "absolute freedom" of contract announced a decade
earlier.6" The subject patents were licensed pursuant to agreements
53. For the purpose of this section, the phrase "patent licensing schemes" is
used as an all encompassing term that includes patent pools.
54. For a similar historical discussion, see Carlson, supra note 19, at 373-78.
55. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co.,186 U.S. 70 (1902).
56. Id. at 71.
57. Id. at 84.
58. Id.at 91.
59. Id.
60. Standard Sanitary Mfg., Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
61. Id. at 35.
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that fixed a minimum sales price, restricted licensees' ability to
deal with third parties, and placed further restrictions on secondary
markets.62 Justice McKenna, writing for the majority, stated that
the licensing agreements "transcended what was necessary to
protect the use of the patent or the monopoly which the law
conferred upon it."63
However, Standard Sanitary avoided
trampling the "definite and extensive" rights conferred by the
patent laws by recognizing that such rights may be pushed to "evil
consequences" without limitation. 64 The Sherman Act, enacted for
the purpose of restraining the potential "evil consequences" of
private contracts, was viewed as an appropriate limitation of those
rights.65 With this pronouncement, courts began to analyze patent
licensing schemes through a balance of antitrust principles and the
existing intellectual property laws.
With the rhetoric of Standard Sanitary in-hand, the scale was
tipped in favor of a more antitrust-based analysis of such licensing
schemes.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States the Court
announced that patent licensing raises antitrust concerns when
cross-licensing agreements aggregate competing processes and the
licensors possess market power. 66However, no opinion highlights
the antitrust trend more than Hartford-EmpireCo. v. UnitedStates;
in that case, the Supreme Court was confronted with an egregious
pool comprised of over 600 patents.67 Contentious litigation
between major competitors in the glass manufacturing industry
spurned the formation of the Hartford-Empire Company that
quickly amassed patents for automated glass manufacturing
machines. 68 The pervasive nature of the pool prompted Justice
Hugo Black to comment: "The history of this country has perhaps
never witnessed a more completely successful economic tyranny
62. Id. at 45-47.
63. Id. at 48.
64. Id. at 49.
65. Id.
66. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 175-78 (1931).
67. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 400 (1945). It is
important to note that the competitive relationship between the 600 patents,
rather than the volume of patents, is disturbing to antitrust law.
68. Id. at 394-95. "The result was that 94% of the glass containers
manufactured in this country on feeders and formers were made on machinery
licensed under the pooled patents." Id. at 400.
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over any field of industry than that accomplished by these
appellants."69
Designed to stifle "initiative, invention, and
competition," the patent pool was struck down as a prohibited use
of patent ownership rights.7°
Yet it was not until the late 1960s that the high water mark of
hostility towards patent licensing schemes crested.71 At that time,
the DOJ "applied a presumption of market power to the grant of a
patent, and therefore gave no consideration to the structural
characteristics of the markets in which patented products
competed."72 Subsequently, with the announcement of the "Nine
No-Nos,"" patent licensing schemes including patent pools were
viewed as per se illegal.

C. The Reemergence of PatentPools
The authoritative per se disapproval of patent licensing practices
substantially retarded the formation of patent pools until the
publication of the 1995 Guidelines. The Guidelines highlight the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 436-37 (Black, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 407.
See Carlson, supra note 17, at 375.
Id. at 375.
The "Nine No-Nos" include:
(i) Requiring a licensee to purchase unpatented materials from
the licensor [tying]; (ii) Requiring a licensee to assign to the
licensor patents issued to the licensee after the licensing
arrangement is executed; (iii) Attempting to restrict the
purchaser of a patented product in the resale of that product;
(iv) Restricting a licensee's freedom to deal in products or
services not within the scope of the patent; (v) Agreeing with
a licensee that the licensor will not, without the licensee's
consent, grant further licenses, to any other person; (vi)
Requiring the licensee to take a package license; (vii)
Requiring the licensee to pay royalties, including total sales
royalties, in an amount not reasonably related to the licensee's
sales of products covered by the patent; (viii) Attempting to
restrict a process patent licensee's sales of products made by
the patented process; and (ix) Requiring a licensee to adhere
to any specified or minimum prices in the sale of the licensed
products.
Id. at 375 n.130.
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Agencies' understanding that the intellectual property and antitrust
laws "share the common purpose of promoting innovation and
enhancing consumer welfare."74 Under the guise of three general
principles, the Guidelines set out a framework through which the
procompetitive benefits of intellectual property licensing
arrangements are weighed against potential anticompetitive
harms.75
Although less restrictive than the per se rule embodied in the
"Nine No-Nos," the Guidelines set forth circumstances in which
patent pool arrangements raise antitrust problems: (1) pooling
arrangements that collectively set price or restrain output;76 (2)
pooling arrangements in the form of settlement agreements
involving cross-licensing arrangements between horizontal
competitors that diminish competition;77 (3) pooling arrangements
that contain exclusive dealing agreements between parties that
collectively possess market power;7" and (4) pooling arrangements
that act to deter or discourage members from investing in research
and development. 79 As a common thread, the 1995 Guidelines
evoke an implied rule of patent pool formation that heavily favors
pooling arrangements comprised strictly of essential (or
complementary) patents versus the inclusion of competitive
patents.8" Business review letters issued by the Department of
Justice integrate a strict essentiality standard into the Agency's
74. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1.0. The IPlaws and antitrust laws
effectuate the common purpose through different means: the IP laws accomplish
the common purpose through the establishment of enforceable property rights;
the antitrust laws do so by prohibiting anticompetitive behavior. See id.
75. Id. § 2.0. The general principles are:
(a) for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard
intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any
other form of property; (b) the Agencies do not presume that
intellectual property creates market power in the antirust
context; and (c) the Agencies recognize that intellectual
property licensing allows firms to combine complementary
factors of production and is generally procompetitive.
Id.
76. See id. § 5.5 at 28.
77. See id.
78. See id. § 5.5 at 28-29.
79. See id. § 5.5, at 29.
80. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.4, at 16-18.
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rule of reason-like analysis. 8 Given the indoctrinated per se rule
against naked price fixing and market division agreements, the
standard comes as no surprise. However, the backbone of the
standard rests on a transitory distinction derived from an expert's
static analysis of dynamic market conditions.1 2 Stripped of its
technical ambiance, the strict essentiality standard merely imparts
an air of certainty on an incalculable problem.83
The Federal Circuit has recently questioned such blind
adherence to a rule that advocates for the formation of pooling
arrangements comprised strictly of complementary patents. 84 The
court's decision in U.S. Philips Corporation works to emphasize
the inherent procompetitive nature of patent licensing packages
comprised of both essential and nonessential patents.85 As
distinguished from per se illegal product tying arrangements, the
Federal Circuit determined that the package licensing of essential
and nonessential patents was procompetitive.86 The licensing
arrangement was analogized to situations in which a licensor
licenses only essential patents and announces that it does not
intend to enforce its rights with respect to nonessential patents.8 7
81. See generally Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to

Carey R. Ramos, Esq., of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10,
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm
(hereinafter DVD Letter).

82. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.2.2 (The Agency, in order "[t]o
identify a technology's close substitutes and this to delineate the relevant
technology market ...

will, if the data permit, identity the smallest group of

technologies and goods over which a hypothetical monopolist of those
technologies and goods likely would exercise market power..
83. See Part I(D), supra.
84. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir.
2005). Although the Commission brought a cause of action for patent misuse
based on an impermissible tying arrangement, the principles of patent misuse
mirror those of the antitrust laws. Id. at 1185.
85. See id. at 1192-93. Such arrangements reduce transaction costs, reduce
the licensor's administrative and monitoring cost, and insure "that a single
licensing fee will cover all the patents needed to practice a particular technology
.....

I d.

86. Id. at 1190.
87. Id. Package licensing of essential and nonessential patents does not
"foreclose [a] competitor from licensing his alternative technology; it merely
puts the competitor in the same position he would be in if he were competing
with unpatented technology." Id.
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The obvious ideological gap discussed in the Federal Circuit's
opinion underscores the present disagreement over the competitive
realities concerning the structure of patent pools.
Today's pooling arrangements target innovation through
efficient inter-firm coordination.88 The rule of reason approach,
rooted in the anticompetitive fears born in Hartford-Empire Co.,
encumbers patent pool architects with burdensome oversight and
arbitrary distinctions. A snapshot of contemporary intellectual
property markets reveals that both patent holders and the antirust
enforcement agencies need a simpler alternative. Coupling a
procompetitive presumption with individual licensing schemes
provides an answer.
IV. OLD POLICIES AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Recent discussion has focused on whether traditional antitrust
principles are pliable to the fast-paced technology markets roamed
by modern intellectual property laws.8 9 Patent pools challenge
traditional antitrust principles in that firms utilize horizontal-like
arrangements to facilitate innovation within highly technical
product markets.9 ° Speaking out on the issue, the 1995 Guidelines
state that contemporary antitrust concerns generated by intellectual
property "can be taken into account by standard antitrust analysis,.
• .and do not require the application of fundamentally different
principles."'" In fact, through a long run approach, as Professor
Lemley argues, the antitrust and intellectual property laws share a
narrow degree of separation. 92 Both bodies of law strive to
maximize wealth through the attainment of allocative and
productive efficiencies. 93 Nonetheless, the distinct means of
88. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 126 (stating that "[t]o solve the
complements problem generally, and to cut through the patent thicket specially,
requires coordination among rights holders").
89. See Posner, supra note 44, at 939.
90. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.3.
91. Id. § 2.1.
92. Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antirust, 13 Sw. J. L.
& TRADE AM. 237, 247 (2007) ("Indeed, when one departs from the static view
of markets and takes a longer-run approach, it is even plausible that IP and the
antitrust laws share a common goal.").
93. See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND
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carrying out each of these laws often places them at odds with one
another.94
Antitrust law strictly condemns collusive action among
horizontal competitors by placing agreements to fix price or divide
markets on its list of per se illegal conduct.95 In traditional
markets, horizontal relationships are readily identified and the
anticompetitive effects of horizontal collusion are often obvious;
however; in contrast, intellectual property markets often feature
relationships that lack definitive classifications-firms enjoy
multilevel business relationships and the degree of competition
among products is unclear at best.96 Consequently, these variables
produce erroneous distinctions and a corresponding threat of Type
I errors.97
Sensitive to the complexities of intellectual property markets,
enforcement agencies advocate a rule of reason approach to avoid
flawed analyses.98 Nonetheless, because the analysis utilizes an
inexact method of placing a competitive label on patents, the rule
of reason functions as an inefficient means of assessing the
competitive consequences of pooling arrangements.99 As a result,
the unpredictable nature of current antitrust review frustrates a
firm's decisions with respect to pool structure and membership.
Therefore, the rule of reason, as a means of effectuating traditional
antitrust principles, may, in some instances, be ill-suited for
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL

1-3 (1973).

Allocative and productive efficient are

maximized when output is unrestricted. Output may be restricted through
"monopolization which diverts production from more urgent to less urgent use
or from legal rules requiring inefficient methods of production." Id. at 3
(emphasis added).
94. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1.0.
95. Id. § 3.4. "Among the restraints that have been held per se unlawful are
naked price-fixing, output restraints, and market division among horizontal
competitors .... " Id.
96. See Part I(D), supra.
97. In antitrust law, a Type I error occurs when competitive acts are wrongly
condemned as anticompetitive behavior. A Type II error, in contrast, occurs
when anticompetitive behavior is found to be competitive. In general, the law
favors Type II errors over Type I. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEx L. REv. 1, 12 (1984) (stating "[flor a number of reasons, errors
on the side of excusing questionable practices are preferable.").
98. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.4.
99. See Part I(D), supra.
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application in the present context. Cognizant of the difficulties
identified above, the procompetitive presumption advanced herein
relies upon basic market functions to bring about old antitrust
principles while providing an alternative means of analyzing
contemporaryproblems.
IV. CURRENT POLICY:

DVD-6 PATENT POOL

Current antitrust enforcement policy produces a strict
essentiality view that patent pooling is permissible only when it
involves blocking or complementary patents. Strict essentiality
has created a risk-adverse environment in which firms structure
patent pools in a prohibitive least restrictive manner regardless of
patent characteristics." °0
This trend diverges from the 1995
Guideline's approach that was intended to assess whether the
proposed pooling arrangement improves overall competitive
conditions of the market.101 Firms' cautionary approach to pooling
arrangements is illustrated through the following discussion of a
business review letter issued by the Justice Department.
In 1999, the DOJ approved a patent pool related to the
manufacture of DVD-ROM and DVD-Video formats.0 2 Six
individual firms claimed ownership of patents related to an
established manufacturing standard." 3 The patent pool offered
licenses to potential third party manufacturers under a licensing
agreement replete with safeguards to competition including a pool
definition of "essential" patents and a quadrennial review of the
pool's offering conducted by an "independent" expert"° representative of the pool members' cautionary approach to
pooling arrangements.
Acting as the independent licensing administrator, Toshiba, a
pool licensor, assembled and offered the pool to potential
licensees.105 The pool was licensed as a package of "essential"
patents defined as those patents necessarily infringed, or having no
100. See Shapiro, supra note 1,at 129.
101. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.1.

102.
103.
104.
105.

See DVD Letter, supra note 81, at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id.
at 2-10.
Id.
at 1.
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realistic alternative, in implementing the standard as determined by
an independent expert.' °6 The royalty rate, set by the pool, was
allocated to licensors in proportion to the individual characteristics
of each patent.' °7 As a complement to the single pool license,
licensors were free to offer individual patent licenses on "fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, whether or not [a
licensee] intend[ed] to manufacture and/or sell DVD Products in
conformity with the DVD Standard Specifications."'0 8 Lastly, a
licensee was obligated to grantback'0 9 any "'essential' patents it
may own or control during the term of license" on reasonable and
non-discriminatory terms. 110

In its prefatory remarks, the Justice Department stated that the
purpose of the review process is to determine "(1) whether the
proposed licensing program here at issue is likely to integrate
complementary patent rights and (2), if so, whether the resulting
competitive benefits are likely to be outweighed by competitive
harm posed by other aspects of the program."' 1 This two-prong
standard outlines the Agency's rule of reason-like analysis.
Irrespective of the reverent balancing purpose, the review
immediately pulls the importance of patent essentiality to the
forefront. "2 The DOJ is critical of the stated definition of
essentiality in that "the definition introduces a degree of
subjectivity into the selection process.""' 3 Nonetheless, the agency
did not offer a more concrete definition other than to state that,
"essential patents have no substitutes." Instead, the DOJ operates
under the assumption that experts will apply the definition

106. Id. at 3. The independent expert was also employed to conduct
quadrennial reviews concerning the essentiality and validity of the patents
included within the pool. Id. at 4.
107. Id. at 7.
108. DVD Letter, supra note 81, at 8.
109. A grantback is an agreement "under which a licensee agrees to extent to
the licensor of intellectual property the right to us the licensee's improvements
to the licensed technology." 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.6.
technology.
110. DVD Letter, supra note 81, at 8.

111. Id. at 10.
112. Seeid. at ll
113. Id. at 12.
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"scrupulously" and "independently."' 14 In the end, the Justice
Department determined that, because of the small royalty rate and
non-discriminatory licensing provisions, the pool arrangement
would not harm competition in related markets." 5 Lastly, the
review endorsed the narrow scope of obligations imposed by the
grantback provision on the licensees." 6
Although the Justice Department ultimately reached an
agreeable conclusion on the competitive nature of the patent pool,
it does so with the furtiveness of a heavyweight boxer in a ballet
class. The review process misplaces its focus on essentiality as the
proper and efficient means to a procompetitive end. In turn, the
process dedicates cursory review to the regulatory potential of
objective provisions such as the independent licensing and royalty
rate schemes. As a consequence of the Agency's obtuse review of
such schemes, the Justice Department unnecessarily complicates
its analysis of latent anticompetitive harms to related markets and
the competitive implications of the grantback provision. The
remainder of this note features the DVD-6 patent pool and related
review as a template from which to compare and analyze potential
alternative means of cultivating a procompetitive end.
VI. THE PROCOMPETITIVE PRESUMPTION
Although intuitively obvious in terms of competitive effect, the
distinction between complementary and substitute patents for a
given process is often blurry even to the well-trained eye. Today's
rule of reason approach teeters on a static analysis, subjectively
undertaken by independent experts. The uncertainty that lies with
dissecting the subtle distinction between complementary and
substitute patents chills the formation of patent pools as firms, and
agencies alike, struggle with the problem of characterization. "'
The consequence of this struggle is that regulatory interference
obstructs the free market attainment of allocative and productive
However, recognition of the procompetitive
efficiencies." 8
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
See
See
See
See

id. at 14.
DVD Letter, supra note 81, at 15-16.
Carlson, supra note 19, at 365-67.
Easterbrook, supranote 97, at 12.
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tendency exhibited by specific objective criteria will obviate the
need for contentious line drawing. Rather than implementing a
rule of reason approach to which all facts are relevant and none
dispositive," 9 antitrust agencies should observe a presumption of
legality in favor of patent pool arrangements that feature individual
licensing schemes.
A. Arguments Against a Per Se Rule
Although the procompetitive characteristics of patent pools are
widely endorsed, a per se rule in favor of certain pooling
arrangements has not gained traction. First, opponents object that
because firms currently market products in violation of others'
patent rights, many patents are legally blocking but factually
competitive; therefore, "pools provides a direct means for restoring
monopoly prices to a competitive market.""12 Second, firms often
acquire blocking patents for the purpose of frustrating competition,
using the bilateral monopoly process to strategically retard
competition. '' Third, pools provide a shelter for invalid patents
from litigation.'22 Licensees and other pool members often do not
challenge patents due to the expense of litigation or the potential
123
deterioration of their long-term relationship with the pool.
Fourth, pools provide a platform for firms that hold both blocking
24
and substitute patent for competing process to act in cahoots.
Even though these concerns are valid, 25 unwavering oversight is
119. Judge Easterbrook comments that with respect to rule of reason-like

formulations "everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive. Any one factor
might or might not outweigh another, or all of the others, in the factfinder's
contemplation." Id.
120. Carlson, supra note 19, at 386.
121. See id. at 385. This objection refers to patent trolls-firms that,

although not engaged in innovation, collect patents and seek to profit through
the threat of infringement suits.
122. See id. at 386-87.
123. See id. at 387. This concern may be dismissed based upon the
observation that royalty rates are often calculated to encourage the members of a
patent pool to challenge the validity of other patents.
124. See id. at 388.
125. For a further discussion, see U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting
Innovation and Competition 66 (2007), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/
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unnecessary to fetter out anticompetitive abuse.
By
acknowledging these objections to a per se rule in favor of certain
pooling arrangements, the procompetitive presumption fosters a
compromise between the ideals of strict essentialist and the
realities of a dynamic and technically complex marketplace.126
B. IndividualLicensing
Patent pools that elect to implement individual licensing should
escape the heavy hand of antitrust scrutiny. Under an individual
licensing requirement, a potential licensee is offered the option to
purchase (1) a single license to the patent pool package and (2) the
option to individually license specific patents (a partial pool
license). The dichotomic nature of individual licensing encourages
procompetitive behavior while efficiently dismantling any
potential for anticompetitive abuse.'27

Apart from the transaction costs of individual licensing,' 28 a pool
consisting purely of complementary or blocking patents is
indifferent to the presence of the licensing scheme. 129 The pool's
indifference arises from the fact such patents are not in direct
competition with one another.13
Given an incentive to offer
individual licensing, a procompetitive pool will elect to include the
licensing provision when its anticipated benefit outweighs its
cost. 131

In contrast, to the extent a pooling arrangement contains
competitive patents, pools provide a means for competitors to
restore supracompetitive prices to a competitive market. 3 2 In this
atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.htm (hereinafter PromotingInnovation and
Competition).

126. See Part V(D) infra.
127. See Josh Lerner, Marcin Strojwas & Jean Tirole, The Design of Patent

Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules 3 (November 4, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/
jlemer/PatPoolEmpiricalPaper.pdf).
128. See Part V(D) infra.
129. Lemer, supra note 127, at 3.
130. Seeid.
131. See id.
132. See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested

Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1569 (1969).
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context, a patent pool operates as a traditional price fixing cartel
whereby competitors collectively remove price competition.33
However, a pool comprised of, or one that contains, substitute
patents is highly unsuitable to individual licensing. 34
C. PatentPools as Cartels
The antitrust laws stand as proof of the dire consequences
collective action among horizontal competitors presents to basic
principles of market competition. For the moment let us put aside
antitrust law's per se treatment of explicit horizontal collusion and
examine the underpinnings of cartel behavior that enable
competitors to set price, fix output, and inflate competitive prices.
At its most basic level, cartelization provides firms selling
homogenous products the opportunity to eliminate price
competition that consumes potential profits.'3 5
Similarly,
intellectual property markets offer holders of substitute patents the
opportunity to eliminate price competition through agreement.' 36
Therefore, coordinated behavior among horizontal competitors in
intellectual property markets may arise when the benefits of
coordination outweigh the costs. '
Several market environments give rise to a greater probability of
cartelization including product homogeneity and low market
concentration.'3 8 First, collusive behavior is more likely to appear
when the demand for a product is inelastic to price. 3' Under
elastic conditions, the monopoly price is set relatively close to the
competitive price-collusive efforts to raise price return marginal
benefits. 4 However, with respect to intellectual property rights,
calculating the probability of cartelization ex ante is a difficult task
as determining the number of substitute technologies a particular

133. See id.
134. See Lerner, supra note 127, at 3.

135. Posner, supra note 132, at 1569.
136. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.1.

137. See Posner, supra note 132, at 1569. "The costs of collusion have two
main components: coordination costs and enforcement costs." Id. at 1570.

138. See id. at 1569.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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technology faces requires a fact intensive inquiry. 4 '
Another important factor affecting firms' propensity to engage
in collusive behavior is the likelihood of new entry.'42 An increase
in expected profits will encourage new firms to enter the market,
and thus, a cartel must include new entrants to avoid harmful price
competition.'43 Furthermore, any growth in cartel membership
complicates coordination efforts and increases post-cartel
competition.'" Likewise, new entrants into intellectual property
markets face the exclusionary powers of patents, the costs of
research and development, and natural entry barriers such as
powerful network effects.'45 However, innovation within new
technology markets often lacks transparency and takes place in
leapfrog progression, complicating any effort to forecast new
entry.'46 Thus, one may not conclude with confidence that firms in
contemporary technology markets face a lesser threat of entry than
those engaged in traditional commodity market exchanges."'
Although natural entry barriers may deter new entry to a degree,
firms in technology markets face a continuing threat of innovation
driven by consumers' hunger for technologically superior
products.' 4 8 This is perhaps best illusrated by the peculiar malerapture of owning the largest high definition television among his
inner circle.
Given that varying combinations of market conditions favor
collusive behavior, coordination and enforcement costs act as a
141. See Posner, supra note 44, at 936-37. Moreover, the inquiry into the
elasticity of demand for a patented technology is admittedly a "comprehensive"
one as it involves the analysis of complex technical data. See 1995 Guidelines,
supra note 2, § 3.4.
142. See Posner, supra note 132, at 1569.
143. An additional risk to consider is that, "should the cartel eventually break
down, the market will find itself with too many firms, leading to ferocious
competition and many failures." Id.
144. Id.
145. See Posner, supra note 44, at 926-30.
146. See id. at 930 (commenting that "[w]e have seen all manner of firms rise
and fall in this industry-falling sometimes from what had seemed a secure
monopoly position").
147. See id. at 929. Discussing the paradox of the new economy, Judge
Posner points out "that competition to obtain a monopoly is an important form
of competition." Id.
148. See id. at 938.
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grave deterrent to cartelization.'49 Coordination costs post a
common problem for all inter-firm organizational efforts,
including procompetitive patent pools.15 In addition, the presence
of enforcement costs, directed at deterring an individual firm's
incentive to cheat, severally impact the viability of collusive
efforts.' 5 '
Cheating is a natural offspring of a cartel's
supracompetitive or above marginal cost price level, as member
firms may choose to undercut its competitors by increasing output
in order to realize short term gains. 5 2 Although destructive to the
cartel's long term interests, such behavior stems from a lack of
trust among cartel members and uncertainty regarding the long
term success of the cartel itself.'53 Thus, in theory, cartels are
more likely to organize through efficient contractual relationships
that impose penalties on cheating firms.'54 However, the antitrust
laws generally disfavor these types of contractual relationships and
specifically prevent such explicit agreements. 55
'
D. An Effective Litmus Test
Within the world of patent pools, individual licensing is an
institutionalized version of cheating. Pools of substitute patents
know ex ante that cheating is eminent and therefore, the pool faces
a known startup risk of deterioration.'56 The individual licensing
regulatory proposition rests on the observation that "[o]wners of
substitute patents do not allow independent licensing as this would
re-create competition with the pool's offering;"' 57 subsequently,
149. Posner, supra note 132, at 1570.
150. See id. "Like any agreement, a price fixing agreement requires
bargaining among the parties, and bargaining is not costless." Id.
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. Id. at 1570.
154. Id. at 1571.
155. See Posner, supra note 132, at 1571 (describing "section I of the
Sherman Act as a device for increasing the costs involved in establishing and
maintaining noncompetitive prices").
156. See id. at 1570. A Posner states that "without assuming that any sellers
are stupid, one can suggest a number of plausible reasons for expecting cheating
to occur." Id.
157. See Lerner, supra note 127, at 5
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independent licensing should be readily endorsed by enforcement
agencies.
On the other hand, within the high-stakes game of intellectual
property licensing, transaction costs often serve as the decisive
factor in the viability of a particular technology.'58 Pooling
arrangements reduce prohibitively high transaction costs, allowing
for improved allocative and productive efficiencies.159 Yet, the
suggestion of individual or partial pool licenses reintroduces, to
some extent, the transaction costs previously eliminated.'60
However, a potential transaction-specific increase in licensing
costs is not fatal to the procompetitive presumption. Presented as
an alternative to the norm, prospective pool creators may weigh
the benefits of streamlined antitrust review under the
procompetitive presumption against the anticipated transaction
costs of individual licensing. Where the perceived frequency of
individual licensing requests is minimal, the benefits of the
presumption will likely outweigh its costs.'6 1 Furthermore,
transaction costs in a multilateral licensing agreement are borne by
the licensee and licensor.'6 2 As a result, patent pool licensors have
an incentive to reduce the likelihood of individual licensing
requests through the elimination of non-essential patents from the
pool's offering-a welcomed result.'6 3
A second plausible objection to viewing individual licensing as
a litmus test of competition is that, by definition, a pool of purely
complimentary patents will not feature individual licensing-any
158. See Jeffery Fromm, Patent Pools and Cross Licensing: Statement for
FTC/DOJHearingon Competition and Intellectual PropertyLaw and Policy in
the Knowledge-Based Economy 5 (April 17, 2002) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020417jefferyfromm.pdf. The impediments of
individual licensing include: "major transaction costs and time required for
multiple negotiations; holders' disincentives to entertain negotiations; likelihood
that the sum of individually negotiated royalties would significantly exceed the
prescribed package license royalty; and the likely necessity of exchanging
competitively sensitive information with one's competitors in the administration
of individual licenses." Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Posner, supra note 132, at 1569.
162. See id. at 1570.
163. See Carlson, supra note 19, at 388 (discussing the possibility that patent

pools may be used to eliminate competition).
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rational licensee will purchase the pool license because all of the
patents are required to practice the technology.
However,
individual licensing is important even in purely complementary
contexts as a potential licensee may wish to develop an innovative
technology independent of the pool's general purpose." 4
Furthermore, pools that offer complementary patents are
indifferent to the presence of individual licensing.'65 Such
indifference is proven by the fact that a licensee, faced with a pool
comprised solely of complementary patents, will purchase the
entire pool license at the pool's profit maximizing price.' 66 This
observation combined with favorable antitrust policy will
encourage patent pools to incorporate, as an option, individual
licensing when the efficiency degrading costs of such licensing are
minimal.
As a litmus test, individual licensing asks whether a patent pool
is procompetitive or anticompetitive. Predictably, assuming a
minimal degree of candor, a uniform pool of either complementary
or substitute patents will be either procompetitive or
anticompetitive.'67 But what answer does a pool with an identity
crisis give? A hybrid pool, one comprised of both complementary
and substitute patents, raises competitive concerns because it
facilitates a reduction in competition between substitute patents
included within the pool and the alternative technology outside of
the pool. 6
The competitive advantage enjoyed by substitute
patents included within the pool risks a spillover effect of reducing
a competitor's willingness to innovate. 169
For the purpose of analysis, a pool that contains a blend of
complementary and substitute patents is analogous to a tying
arrangement.' 70
The anticompetitive underpinning of a tying
arrangement forces a consumer to purchase something the
consumer would not otherwise have selected.' 7' The key inquiry

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id. at 4.
Lerner, supra note 127, at 3.
See id.
See id.
See Carlson, supra note 19, at 388.
See id.; see also 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, §3.1.
US. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1190.
Id. at 1190.
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in evaluating a patent-to-patent tying arrangement is whether the
licensee is forced to purchase something more.'
The value of a patent pool, to both the licensor and licensee, is
derived from the pool's essential patents.'
Hence the profit
maximizing price charged by the pool is based on market demand
for the essential patents.' 74 The inclusion of nonessential patents
restructures the intra-pool division of profits, rather than increasing
the price paid by a licensee. Therefore, the licensee is not forced
to purchase something more; the licensee receives more for his
purchase price.'75 Nevertheless, opposite a consumer-based focus,
the immediate potential harm that results from a patent-to-patent
tie may directly affect competitors.'76 If a licensee acquires access
to a technology covered by a nonessential patent through its patent
pool license, the licensee may choose not to license a competitor's
alternative technology. However, the pool's combination of both
essential and non-essential patents has not adversely harmed
competition any more than had the licensor decided to package
only essential patents and guarantee a licensee that it would not
enforce its patent rights with respect to the nonessential patents.' 77
In both situations, a competitor must persuade the licensee to
purchase a license for its alternative technology over a freely
available process. 7 This response parlays to answer concerns that
hybrid patent pools harm a competitor's incentive to innovate.
In addition to leaving the competitive environment unscathed,
hybrid pool offerings also generate procompetitive benefits. The
inclusion of alternative patented processes reduces the licensee's
search and transaction costs associated with implementing a
172. See id. at 1190-91.
173. See id. at 1191-92.
174. See id. at 1192. The court stated that "[i]t is entirely rational for a
patentee who has a patent that is essential to particular technology, as well as
other patents that are not essential, to charge what the market will bear for the
essential patent" and to offer the nonessential patents free of charge. Id.
175. See id. at 1190.
176. See U.S. Phillips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1190.
177. See id. "By analogy, if [the licensor] had decided to surrender its
'nonessential' patents or had simply announced that it did not intend to enforce
them, there would have been no way for the [licensee] to decline or reject [the
licensor's] decision." Id.
178. See id.
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specific technology.179 Further, as the number of patents within
the pool rises and the probability of unintentional infringement
decreases, a licensee is able to reduce its uncertainty with respect
to investment decisions. 80 Similarly, the licensor is able to reduce
monitoring costs of its patent inventory, since the incorporation of
the licensor's inventory into the patent pool's portfolio provides
the licensor with a reliable method of collecting on the use of its
patents. 8 ' Therefore, it is important to consider that the fractional
presence of competitive patents within a pooling arrangement
should not undercut the value of a simplified review process
supplied by the procompetitive presumption.
E. Perfect Information
The transactional efficiency of intellectually property markets is,
unremarkably, hindered by a lack of perfect information. Perfect
information describes a state of complete knowledge over the
actions of firms engaged in a market-an unattainable outcome in
real world circumstances.' 82 Nonetheless, firms and consumers
may, and do, collect useful information related to competitive
products through price and objective quality comparisons.
However, it is difficult to make these types of comparisons in the
intellectual property world because of the closed and proprietary
nature of the market.183 Therefore, the regulatory function of
individual licensing fails to climax under conditions of imperfect
information, thereby reducing the ability of a licensee to
distinguish between complementary and substitute patents-an
ability that would otherwise significantly dilute the capacity of a
184
pool to market factually competitive patents as complements.
Yet licensees of patents are generally sophisticated businesses
operating within the same sphere of technology as the licensor.
179. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.5.
180. See U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1193; see also Carlson, supra note
19, at 381.
181. U.S. Philips Corp., 424F.3dat 1193.
182. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 127, at 3-4 (discussing the startup problems
a patent pool faces when determining what patents and technology are required
to complete the pool's offering).
183. See id.
184. See id.; see also 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.2.2.
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Individual licensing schemes afford these sophisticated licensees a
choice and allow potential licensees to differentiate between
complementary and substitute patents versus a technically
inexperienced court.185 These licensees are, unlike the judicial
system, well suited to make this determination. Likewise, they
provide a much more cost-efficient means of assigning patent
character, the alternative being that these determinations would be
made during contentious litigation.'86
F. A Rebuttable Presumption
The procompetitive presumption granted to pools containing
individual licensing schemes is a powerful tool that mitigates the
deleterious effects of rigorous antitrust scrutiny. However, such
power should not be wielded blindly. The presumption, in order to
promote the overall goal of designing a more efficient means of
pool formation and regulation, should provide an opportunity for
focused rebuttal. The avenues of rebuttal must be carefully
construed so as not to invite litigation that could be used to falsely
condemn procompetitive behavior.'87
As a precondition for attacking this presumption, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the pool members collectively possess market
power within a relevant market. 8 Without market power the
pooling arrangement does not present a discernable threat to
competition, as the pool may not profitably raise price or reduce
output if a competitor stands willing to sell or produce at the
competitive level.8 9
Since a patent no longer carries a
presumption of market power, the standard applied to intellectual

185. See Posner, supra note 44, at 937.
186. See id. at 939.
187. See Easterbrook, supra note 97, at 14-16. Judge Easterbrook points out
that "[t]he economic system corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects
judicial errors. There is no is no automatic way to expunge mistaken decisions
of the Supreme Court. A practice once condemned is likely to stay contemned,
no matter its benefits. A monopolistic practice wrongly excused will eventually
yield to competition, though, as the monopolist's higher prices attract rivalry."
Id. at 14.
188. See id. at 19.

189. See id. at 20.
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property markets mirrors that applied in traditional markets. 9°
Consistent with the market power standard applied in traditional
markets, the relevant intellectual property market inquiry can be
defined either through a product, technology, or geographic market
(depending on the nature of the technology).'91 Meanwhile, a
pooling arrangement may defend against a finding of market
power by demonstrating that other firms have the incentive and
innovative capacity to compete in the future.'9 2 Overall, the
underlying purpose of the market power standard stems from the
desire to remove judicial interference in circumstances apt to
market correction (i.e., restraints imposed by a pool that lacks
market power).193
A finding of market power alone does not warrant stripping the
patent pool of its procompetitive presumption. The plaintiff must
next demonstrate that the individual licensing scheme presents a
realistic threat of harming consumers through higher price or lower
output.'94 Anticompetitive harm may result when individual
licensing has decreased the transactional efficiency of the pool,
thereby increasing the overall price, or decreasing the output, of a
technology.' 95 Here an important dividing line is needed between
individual licenses taken for use in conformity with the pool's
purpose and those licenses purchased for independent technology
development. The costs associated with purchases made for
independent development are distinct from the costs of licenses
purchased for use in conformity with the pool's purpose and
scheme. Here, for the purpose of demonstrating anticompetitive
effects, the analysis should be limited to the overall increase in the
cost of licenses taken for use in conformity with the pool's primary
purpose.
The procompetitive presumption may also be rebutted where
190. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2.1.
191. Id., § 3.2.
192. See Posner, supra note 44, at 930. Further, as Judge Posner suggests,
the competition for monopoly power is an important form of competition in the
new economy. Id. at 929.
193. See Easterbrook, supra note 97, at 21. Judge Easterbrook notes that
"when there is no market power, the market is better than the judicial process in
discriminating the beneficial from the detrimental." Id.
194. See id. at 23-24.
195. See id.
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individual licenses are awarded on a systematic basis masking an
anticompetitive agreement between competing technologies.'96
Vertical arrangements between firms including tying and restricted
dealing are examples of systematic anticompetitive behavior.'97 In
this scenario a plaintiff must prove that, absent the systematic
agreement, licenses would be offered at lower prices. 9 '
Ultimately, the party challenging the procompetitive presumption
is charged with the burden of demonstrating a logical relationship
between the patent pool's profits and harm to competition. 9 9
The avenues of rebuttal are not designed to create an
insurmountable barrier to well-grounded challenges. However, as
individual licensing provides a pool with an economic incentive to
act procompetitively, one should be mindful of a standard that
permits judicial interference based on an anticompetitive hunch.200

VII. ANCILLARY EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL LICENSING
The various elements of a patent pool-individual licensing, the
independent expert, the royalty rate scheme, and the grantback
provision among others-do not function in a vacuum. Therefore,
an analysis of the competitive qualities of a specific pooling
arrangement should not examine the elements in isolation. With
the aid of the Justice Department's DVD business review letter,
the following discussion highlights possible spillover effects
created by individual licensing with respect to various aspects of
patent pools.
A. The IndependentExpert's Role
The Justice Department's DVD-6 business review letter
expresses speculative concern over (first) the independent expert's
ability to reliably distinguish between complementary and
substitute patents, and (second) the expert's degree of
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See id. at 29-3 1.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 23-24
See Easterbrook, supra note 97, at 23-24.
See id. at 14.
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impartiality. 21 The regulatory role of individual licensing should
obviate, to a large degree, the Department of Justice's concern
with a subjective selection process. Additionally, the fact that two
patents are complementary or essential today is not determinative
of the patents' future competitive relationship. Technology
developments or price fluctuations, among many factors, may alter
the relationship between two patents in terms of substitutability. 202
In turn, this may decrease the value of any static analysis
conducted by experts. Alternatively, allowing the market, through
individual licensing to conduct the process provides for a more
responsive and cost-effective means of review by reducing the
independent expert's role.0 3 Moreover, the lack of "truly neutral
competent experts" casts doubt over the value and utility of any
expert review process to being with.2° Moving the role of the
independent expert into the background may also lessen the burden
on pool members to divulge competitively sensitive proprietary
information.
B. Royalty Rate Schemes
The intra-pool division of royalty fees also works to eliminate
competitively degrading elements from patent pools. In general,
and as is evident from the structure of the DVD-6 pool, royalty
rate schemes are generally designed to allocate fees among
member licensors in proportion to the frequency of licensee
"infringement" with respect to a specific patent. 25 A licensor
garners a royalty fee in proportion to the number of infringed
patents owned by the licensor. 26 The desire of each licensor to
grab a larger share of the collected royalty fees creates a monetary
incentive, on the part of all members, to remove unproductive
patents from the pool. 2 7 Given that the value of a patent pool is
positively related to the percentage of total essential patents
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See DVD Letter, supra note 81, at 12-13.
See Carlson, supra note 19, at 365.
See Posner, supra note 44, at 937-39.
Id. at 937.
See DVD Letter, supra note 81, at 7.
See id.
See id. at 13.
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included,2 "8 pool members will encourage the removal of
nonessential patents. Although the Justice Department has
recognized the procompetitive outcome generated by royalty rate
schemes, this issue deserves a greater focus.
C. GrantbackProvisions
In a standard patent pool arrangement, grantback provisions
generally require a licensee to license back to the pool the (1)
rights to any improvements developed by the licensee and (2)
patents held by the licensee that are essential to the pool's
underlying purpose or standard. 29 However, these provisions
generate concern because of the possibility that they may reduce a
licensee's incentive to innovate."' In particular, these provisions
may dilute a licensee's ability to recapture, through exclusive
patent rights, the high costs often associated with research and
development.2 1 ' Nonetheless, grantback provisions provide a
number of procompetitive benefits to pools that utilize individual
licensing schemes.
Remember that patent pools comprised of complementary (or
blocking) patents generally form to avoid the hold-up problem
such that the licensor and licensee can reduce costs. 2 12 Ideally, a
patent pool will contain a complete set of complementary patents
in order to maximize cost savings, but imperfect information with
respect to intellectual property rights and the proprietary nature of
such information, restricts the formation of a compete set.2"3
However, a grantback provision may be utilized to form a
complete set of complementary patents where a patent pool desires
to protect itself from falling victim to the hold-up problem-a
grant provision insures that the pool will have rights to the
necessary technology.2"4 Because grantback provisions encourage
the initial formation of as well future participation in patent pools,

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See US. Philip Corp., 424 F.3d at 1192.
1995 Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.6.
See id.
Id.
See Lerner, supra note 127, at 5-6.
See id. at 3.
See id.
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they are a necessary component of competitive patent pools. 215
The current patent system, when it grants improvement patents,
often tends to under compensate entrepreneurial patent holders
while overcompensating those holding the improvement patent.216
By analogy, in the context of patent pools, licensors are
entrepreneurial patent holders
and licensees represent
improvement patent holders. A grantback provision will, in some
circumstances, permit a licensor (or entrepreneurial patent holder)
to capture a greater portion of its patent's value when a licensee
later includes improvement patents in the patent pool.
Finally, a grantback provision will not automatically reduce a
non-licensee's incentive to innovate. The value of an essential
patented process (i.e., a monopoly), and the associated bargaining
power that often follows, provides adequate assurance for the
continuation of outside innovation. 27 Any anticipated reduction in
a licensee's incentive to innovate must be correspondingly setoff
by an outsider's willingness to invest in the research and
development process.1 8
The Justice Department has extended favorable treatment to
grantback provisions when they are tailored to further the
underlying purpose of the patent pool and do not serve to stifle
competition. 29 The DVD-6 patent pool agreement required
licensees to license-back their present and future essential
patents.2 In this context, the Department endorsed the grantback
provision on the basis that by bringing other essential patents into
the patent pool, no licensees would present a hold-up threat in the
future. 221 Given the facilitative role that individual licensing
requirements play in the formation and maintenance of
procompetitive patent pools, grantback provisions-limited in
215. See id.
216. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1991, 2044 (2007). The authors conclude that "under
current law patentees whose inventions are only one component of a larger
product are systematically overcompensated." Id.
217. See Posner, supra note 44, at 929-30.
218. See id.
219. See DVD Letter, supra note 81, at 15-16; see also 1995 Guidelines,
supra note 2, § 5.6.
220. DVD Letter, supra note 81, at 8.
221. See id. at 15-16.
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scope to present and future essential patents-should be readily
endorsed when coupled with such licensing requirements.
D. Reasonable and NondiscriminatoryTerms
When a patent pool elects to offer individual licenses it must
determine a price standard at which licensors will offer their
patents. The contemporary approach adopts the often cited, but
never squarely defined, standard of fair, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms."'
The reasonableness
requirement of RAND is difficult to calculate and even more
difficult to bargain for as intellectual property rights are not traded
within ready markets capable of supplying price comparisons. 3
In its attempt to define a reasonable price in the context of
intellectual property licenses, the Second Circuit has negatively
defined the term as unreasonable when the price for the license is
higher than the value of the intellectual property rights obtained. 4
Rather than solving the RAND puzzle, this definition merely
rephrases the inquiry related to the value of the subject patent. 5
In addition, other more pointed questions must be asked: (1) if the
subject patent does not face substitute competition, may the
licensor charge a price equal to the complete pool royalty fee? (2)
if the subject patent faces competition, is the price properly
constrained by such competition? and (3) should antitrust meddle
at all with the price an individual patent holder charges for
licensing rights?
The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this
note, but patent pools, like other commercial entities, are
constrained by the following business realities that may prevent
individual licensing regimes from sliding into a pit of complicated
price negotiations. First and foremost, the licensor's reputation
always precedes it. As such, a licensor has an incentive to transact
fairly with a licensee as the transaction is but one of many repeated
222. See, e.g., Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1984).
223. As an illustration, the New York Stock Exchange provides a ready
market for the exchange of securities.
224. Buffalo Broad. Co., 744 F.2d at 926.
225. See id.
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business interactions. Secondly, a most-favored-nations clause
may be implemented to settle difficulties and conflicts found
during repeated RAND negotiations. Ultimately, the final price of
an individual license should be surveyed to preclude the
facilitation of downstream price coordination.
A patent pool that elects to adopt an individual licensing
requirement will, optimally, have weighed the costs of negotiating
price terms against the benefits of the procompetitive presumption.
The concerns associated with RAND, therefore, should not
interfere with the efficiency enhancing prospects of the
presumption.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Technology industries now frequently use patent pool
arrangements because they allow firms to pursue innovation while
reducing high licensing costs and the threat of patent hold-ups. At
this time, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission analyze patent pools under a rule of reason approach;
as such, patent pools must satisfy a strict essentiality standard,
which unfortunately presupposes doubt on such agreements and
chills future efforts to form the same. If firms do not have a
predictable, static definition of essentiality, the application of this
strict essentiality standard within a dynamic intellectual property
market may produce unharmonious outcomes.
As an alternative, patent pools that elect to adopt an individual
licensing provision should escape the intrusive audit conducted
pursuant to the current standard and should instead enjoy a
procompetitive presumption. The presumption diverts from the
rule of reason not in purpose, but in function. Rather than relying
on a subjective classification of patent characteristics, the
presumption utilizes market-based principles to eradicate
competition-reducing patents from the pool's portfolio.
An
internalization of the rule of reason's regulatory function will
permit more efficient
formation and maintenance of
procompetitive patent pools while avoiding the threat of falsepositives invoked by today's patent characterization system.
However, an agency split between the DOJ and FTC concerning
Section 2 of the Sherman Act may spell, albeit indirectly, a
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derailment of free market antitrust policies including the
procompetitive presumption suggested by this note. The Justice
Department has released a statement concerning the Department's
approach to analyzing single-firm conduct that aptly reflects a
reliance on market-based principles to correct inefficient and
anticompetitive behavior.226 In response, the FTC issued a
statement indicating its intent to fill the enforcement gap created
by the DOJ's new (radical) standard.227 The FTC's statement, and
general disagreement with the DOJ, strikes at the foundation of the
procompetitive presumption's reliance on market-based principles
as a substitute for intrusive antitrust enforcement. Prior to the
publication of the 1995 Guidelines, concerns about the antitrust
laws constrained any innovation through licensing agreements.
With the past in mind, a more hands-off approach to antirust
enforcement would appear to facilitate long-run innovation at
minimal costs to short-run competition. Whatever the outcome of
the current debate, the coming future of the relationship between
the antitrust and intellectual property laws is guaranteed to be
interesting. For the sake of tech-savvy consumers, however, one
can only hope that the enforcement agencies do not revert back to
the 8-track days of the Nine No-Nos.
R. JustinKoscher*
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